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concentrated tradable ownership reduce earnings management, while total ownership 
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1   Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Earnings are an important performance measure of companies. Earnings management is a 
pervasive phenomenon in firms’ financial reporting and their release of earnings-related 
information. In earnings management, managers use discretion in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions, and thus, often the reported earnings diverge from the true economic 
performance of the company. 
A large body of work has been developed in earnings management research. One 
stream concerns the consequence of earnings management. Francis et al. (2004) investigate 
equity cost of capital in relation to earnings management, and find that earnings management 
distorts earnings quality; and thereby, earnings  quality is negatively associated with the 
equity cost of capital. Easley and O’Hara (2004) state that earnings management introduces 
information asymmetry and uninformed investors must be compensated with a risk premium. 
Leuz et al. (2003) indicate that earnings management conceals firm performance from 
outsiders, and thus earnings management decreases investor protection. 
Other stream of research on earnings management concentrates on the determination of 
earnings management; that is, what motivations and factors lead a firm’s manager to 
manipulate earnings. Dechow et al. (1996) find that earnings-manipulated firms usually have 
higher leverage ratios and are more likely to avoid debt covenants during and after the 
manipulation period than control firms. Both Scholes et al. (1992) and Maydew (1997) show 
that companies timing revenues and expense recognition to take advantage of lower tax rates 
or defer income in anticipation of a change to a lower tax rate. Other studies (Hayn, 1995; 
Dechow et al., 2003; Beaver et al., 2007) indicate that companies manage earnings for ‘target 
beating’ to meet analysts’ forecasts and contractual income levels, or to avoid an inverse 
earnings trend that may lead to negative market feedback. 
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Recently,  the  investigations  on  the  relationship  between  earnings  management, 
corporate governance and ownership structure remain high. According to some, ‘better’ 
corporate governance, such as more independent directors and effective monitoring, reduces 
the likelihood of fraud (Farber, 2005; Joe and Vandervelde, 2007). For others, CEO turnover, 
high audit committee quality and the separation of CEO and board chair mitigate earnings 
management behaviour (Doyle et al., 2007b; Vafeas, 2005; Farber, 2005). Some studies 
suggest  that  greater  managerial  ownership  has  an  entrenchment  effect  —  managers 
expropriate  private  benefits  through  their  choice  of  accounting  method  (Smith,  1976; 
Dhaliwal et al., 1982). 
Earnings management is pervasive activity for Chinese publically listed firms, which 
has attracted increasing studies. Firth et al. (2007) examine the informativeness of earnings 
for Chinese firms listed on the market from 1998 to 2003. They find that firms with highly 
concentrated share ownership have lower earnings informativeness. Foreign shareholders and 
the high percentage of tradable shares appear to enhance the earnings–returns relation. 
Independent directors, but the board size and the number of board meetings, are negatively 
associated with the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals. Liu and Lu (2007) 
investigate the relation between earnings management and corporate governance using a 
sample  of  Chinese  listed  firms  from  1999  to  2005.  They  show  that  good  corporate 
governance mitigate earnings management. They find that the ownership of the first top 
shareholders has positive, while the ownership of remaining large shareholders from top 2 to 
top 10 has negative relation with earnings management. Wang and Yung (2011) study a 
sample of Chinese firms for the period 1998 – 2006 and find that earnings management is 
lower in state owned enterprise than private owned firms. Xu et al. (2012) employ a naïve 
method to test the relations between ownership type and earnings quality for Chinese publicly 
listed firms commencing 1999 through 2006. They document that private controlled firms, 
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foreign invested firms and society owned firms outperform the state controlled firms in 
earnings quality. 
Our research applies a relatively recent sample of Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 
 
2010 and focuses on how ownership characteristics determine earnings management 
incentives. Our research has two significant differences from prior studies on the relations 
between ownership and earnings management of Chinese listed firms. First, we intensively 
test the impact of ownership characteristics on earnings management behaviour, including 
foreign ownership, state ownership, tradable ownership, institution ownership, managerial 
ownership. The existing literature normally examines one or a couple of the above ownership 
types interactively with corporate governance issues (Firth et al., 2007; Wang and Yung, 
2011; Wang and Campbell, 2012). Although Xu et al. (2012) refer a set of ownership types, 
their ownership types are categorised mainly different from ours. Second, the novelty in our 
research  is  that  we  define  two   types  of  ownership  concentration:  total  ownership 
concentration and tradable ownership concentration. Because of the fact that majority of top 
owners are non-tradable shareholders for many firms, we suspect that the tradable ownership 
concentration has different determination from total ownership concentration on earnings 
management. Ownership concentration is an important concern in existing research on 
earnings management, but is measured only as total ownership concentration (Firth et al., 
2007; Liu and Lu, 2007; Ding et al., 2007) 
 
Our empirical results show that total ownership concentration fosters earnings 
manipulation, while tradable ownership concentration resists earnings management. We find 
that firms whose largest owner is the state are less likely to manipulate earnings, although the 
ratio of state ownership is positively associated with earnings management on average. 
Foreign  investors  are  unable  to  restrain  firm’s  earnings  management,  while  managerial 
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ownership  appears  positively  related  to  earnings  management.  In  addition,  institutional 
ownership by fund companies has insignificant impacts on earnings management. 
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant 
literature and develops hypotheses; Section 3 explains the data and defines variables; Section 
4 is the description of statistics; Section 5 is the regression analyses and Section 6 concludes 
the paper. 
 
 
 
2 Ownership Characteristics and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1 Ownership Characteristics 
 
China’s companies have multiple ownership types and unique ownership characteristics 
that differ from other countries. First, common shares sold publicly in the domestic market to 
Chinese residents are called ‘A shares’, while those sold initially to foreign investors are 
called ‘B shares’. B shares have been accessible by Chinese residents since the restriction 
was removed in April 2001. H shares are those issued by China’s companies and traded on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. This research only includes firms that issued A shares, or A 
shares and B shares, and/or H shares. 
Second, a large proportion of shares are publicly non-tradable. The initial purpose for 
Chinese government to establish a stock market was to raise capital rather than a thorough 
reform for a pure market drawn economy. Thus, the founders of many companies maintain 
ownership control by holding a large proportion of non-tradable shares. Even though the 
proportion of non-tradable shares has reduced due to financial market reforms, the proportion 
is still high, at 39 percent on average from 2004 to 2010. 
Third, state ownership has remained high because many publicly listed firms were 
carved out or spun off from existing state enterprises. The state is the ultimate controlling 
shareholder or the largest shareholder for many listed firms. In recent years, the listing of 
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non-state owned companies has increased. Such companies are called private firms or civilian 
firms in the literature, and are ultimately controlled by non-government units, including 
individuals, collective enterprises, and social entities. 
Fourth, the ownership of China’s listed firms is highly concentrated. This high level of 
ownership concentration has not only resulted from the many listed firms that were carved 
out from state enterprises, where the state retains a large proportion of shares, but also 
through family founder’s private firms that preferred to maintain their controlling ownership. 
In particular, the ownership concentration in China can be categorized as total ownership and 
tradable ownership concentration. The large tradable shareholders and non-tradable 
shareholders have various motivations in earnings management. 
Fifth, institutional ownership is relatively low in China, and is mainly held by fund 
companies. However, institutional ownership represents specialist management of shares, and 
thus is different from individual shareholders in monitoring of firms. Finally, the managerial 
ownership has been recognized by Chinese authority in recent years. An increasing number 
of  firms  have  awarded  shares  to  managers  or  have  included  shares  in  managers’ 
remunerations. Although the amount of managerial ownership of China’s listed firms is small, 
it may have observable influence on firm’s management decision. 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
China’s firms issue A shares to domestic investors, while some also issue shares to foreign 
investors such as B shares and H-shares. Foreign investors are usually perceived to be more 
knowledgeable and sophisticated than domestic investors in terms of investment experience 
and the ability to collect, process, and analyse value-relevant information (Gul et al., 2010). 
However, foreign ownership is only about 8.63 percent of total shares outstanding on average. 
Thus foreign investors may be unable to monitor the firms effectively. 
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The regulatory requirements for information disclosure for firms with foreign 
shareholders differ from those for firms with only domestic shareholders. Firms that 
exclusively issued A shares are required to prepare financial reports in accordance with 
domestic accounting standards (DAS). In contrast, A-share firms that simultaneously issued 
B shares or H shares were required to provide financial reports based on both the DAS and 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), or based on both DAS and Hong Kong 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Gul et al., 2010; Wang, 2010). 
Investors may recognize that the IFRS and GAAP, rather than DAS, enhance 
information transparency. Therefore, firms with foreign investment should engage in less 
earnings management. However, because the DAS and IFRS and DAS and GAAP are 
inconsistent in some parts, in order to produce financial report that comply with two 
accounting standards, earnings management may be used to a certain extent, although this 
type of earnings management may not break accounting rule. Thus we present our first 
hypothesis: 
H1. Firms with foreign investment in B shares or H shares may have more 
incentives to manage earnings than firms with only domestic investment in A 
shares. 
The function of state ownership is always in debate. Most studies examine the 
relationships between state ownership and firm value. According to resource-based theory, 
state-owned firms have advantages in their access to resources, tax benefits and a secured 
operation environment, which all add to the value of state-owned firms (Ma et al., 2010; Sun 
et al., 2002). In contrast, according to agency theory, state-owned firms have the burden of 
social responsibility and political objectives, such as maintaining employment and satisfying 
government annual revenue goals. Therefore, state-owned firms would not be able to make 
optimal decisions and this decreases their value (Gunasekarage et al., 2007; Wei et al., 2005). 
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Several   studies   referring   the   relation   between   state   ownership   and   earnings 
management of Chinese listed firms provides mixed arguments. Chen et al. (2008) document 
that state assists earnings management exists only in firms controlled by local governments, 
because local governments are more likely to provide subsidies for the firms for achieving 
listing requirements. Wang and Yung (2011) indicate that the protection to state owned firms 
by the government leads to a different incentive structure in state enterprises, which in turn, 
results in lower levels of earnings management. 
We posit a different argument that the state ownership of a firm can be owned by 
various state agencies, such as State Asset Management Bureaus, SOEs affiliated to the 
central government, and SOEs affiliated to local government respectively; alternatively, the 
state ownership of a firm can be owned by different state entities. In the situation that state 
shares are owned by several owners and each owner has its own interest and non-economic 
concerns, state owned firms may conduct more earnings management. However, when a state 
agency is the largest owner of a firm, the firm is normally in key industries and dominates 
relevant production or service. Because of the support from government, this type of firms 
possesses advantages in access to resources and markets. Managers also tend to be politically 
connected and political promotion is a type of compensation parallel to salary and bourns. 
Managers of those firms have less incentives and necessary to manage earnings. Thus, we 
present our second hypothesis: 
H2: State ownership is positively related to earnings management unless a 
state agency is the largest shareholder of the firm, in which earnings 
management incentives and necessity are mitigated. 
Gedajlovic et al. (2005) classify shareholders into three categories: ‘stable investors,’ 
 
‘market investors,’ and ‘inside investors.’ Each of these has a relatively distinct investment 
objective. The stable investors comprise affiliated firms, banks and insurance companies. 
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Stable investors are willing to keep the ownership, primarily to cement and grow stable 
business relationships, rather than to earn returns on their equity investment. Market investors 
are ‘pure investors,’ in that they are typically tied to the firm by their equity stakes, and have 
maximizing equity returns as their primary investment objective. 
Ma et al. (2010) use the two concepts of ‘stable investors’ and ‘market investors’ to 
explain  the  ownership  of  China’s  listed  firms.  The  holders  of  non-tradable  shares  are 
definitely stable investors, because their shares are not tradable on stock exchanges. However, 
if the share price changes, the stable investors have no other choice but to hold onto the 
shares. It is true that one of the objectives of state and legal person non-tradable shareholders 
is to maintain control and involvement in the firms. In contrast, the holders of tradable shares 
are market investors who have the exclusive objective of maximizing returns. 
Heugens et al. (2009) argue that firms may be sensitive to the pressures of market 
investors for two reasons. First, market investors will be more willing to sell their ownership 
stake when they are dissatisfied with the firm’s performance. Selling off a large number of 
shares is a powerful disciplining force, since it is likely to decrease the firm’s share price and 
thus increase the cost of equity capital. Second, market investors will require a risk premium 
when they fear problems such as tunnelling (expropriating firm assets) or opportunistic 
earnings management, which increases the firm’s cost of equity capital. These disciplinary 
forces make it more likely that the firm’s managers will engage in strategies consistent with 
the investment objectives of market investors, and mitigate the likelihood of opportunistic 
earnings management. Thus we present our third hypothesis: 
H3:  The  tradable  ownership  ratio  is  negatively  associated  with  earnings 
management due to the disciplining power of selling shares. 
Dispersed ownership structure is usually observed in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as 
the  US  and  UK.  In  other  developed  and  developing  countries,  ownership  is  relatively 
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concentrated, because firms are usually controlled by founding families and/or government, 
such as in Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and China. Leuz et al. (2003) find less 
earnings management occurred in companies in countries with dispersed ownership, strong 
investor rights, and legal enforcement. Heugens et al. (2009) state that ownership 
concentration is an efficient corporate governance strategy in markets with poor legal 
protection of minority shareholders. 
The majority of empirical research asserts that concentrated ownership provides block 
holders with both incentives and power in monitoring firms to improve quality decisions, 
implying less opportunity for earnings management (Yeo et al., 2002; Jiraporn and Gleason, 
2007). Princus et al. (2007) find accrual anomalies resulting from earnings management are 
negatively associated with share ownership concentration. However, some studies suggest 
that   greater   ownership   concentration   by   managerial   and   family   ownership   has   an 
entrenchment effect: managers extrapolate private benefits through their accounting method 
choice (Smith, 1976; Dhaliwal et al., 1982). Haw et al. (2004) provide evidence that firms 
with a larger concentration of control on cash flow rights engage in higher levels of earnings 
management. Leuz (2006) demonstrates that ownership concentration is positively associated 
with the level of earnings management. 
Maug (1998) documents a theory of lock-up effect and liquidity effect to describe the 
relationship between ownership concentration and monitoring. In the lock-up effect, an 
increase in the degree of ownership concentration strengthens large shareholders’ incentives 
to monitor the firm’s management, because owning a larger stake makes the return on the 
firm’s shares more significant for the large shareholders. In the liquidity effect, if a large 
proportion of total shares is owned by the large shareholders, then fewer shares are held by 
minority shareholders, meaning there is less liquidity in the shares. This occurs, because lack 
of liquidity means that small shareholders have a free ride on the effort of large shareholders, 
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and the incentives of large shareholders to monitor the firm decreases. Alternatively, large 
shareholders   may   force   managers   to   manipulate   earnings   to   expropriate   minority 
shareholders’ wealth. 
Shares listed in China’s domestic market comprise tradable and non-tradable shares; 
thus, concentrated ownership can be measured by total ownership concentration and tradable 
ownership concentration. With respect to total ownership concentration, most of the top large 
owners are non-tradable shareholders, such as legal persons and the state with various 
representatives.  For example, the top five shareholders hold 50.57  percent of shares on 
average, and 90 percent of these shares are non-tradable in our sample period. Firm 
performance is not a determination for changing the controlling position of large shareholders. 
Therefore, the liquidity effect functions with respect total ownership concentration in China. 
Thus we present our fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Total ownership concentration is positively related to earnings 
management due to the liquidity effect resulting from non-tradable ownership. 
In contrast, tradable ownership is less concentrated than total ownership. For example, 
the top five tradable shareholders only hold 14.64 percent tradable shares on average. The 
large tradable shareholders are confronted with both expropriations by large non-tradable 
shareholders and entrenchment by managers. Firm performance and resulting trading 
behaviour not only determines returns, but also changes the firm’s position in ownership 
ranking. Thus, the large tradable shareholders have a great incentive to monitor firms that 
mitigate their earnings management. The lock-up effect functions with respect to tradable 
ownership concentration. Thus we present our fifth hypothesis: 
H5:  Tradable  ownership  concentration  is  negatively  related  to  earnings 
management due to the lock-up effect resulting from tradable ownership. 
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Institutional investors are generally thought to have better access to timely information 
and to be capable of accurate analysis. Thus, institutional investors are more capable of 
detecting earnings management than individual investors. Also, institutional investors usually 
hold a larger number of shares than individual investors. On one hand, institutional investors 
have strong incentives to monitor the firm’s performance and relevant management that 
determine the firm’s value. On the other hand, institutional investors have monitoring power, 
in terms of holding a large proportion of shares. 
Chung et al. (2002) give evidence that the presence of large institutional shareholdings 
prevents managers from increasing or decreasing reported profits towards managers’ desired 
level or range of profits. Bushee (1998) find that institutional investors create less incentives 
for a firm’s management to cut research and development expenditures to attain short-term 
targets. Jiambalvo (1996) find that absolute discretionary accruals have a negative association 
with institutional ownership. These evidences are consistent with institutional investors 
monitoring and constraining the self-serving behaviour of corporate managers. 
Koh (2007) classify institutional investors into ‘transient’ or ‘long term’ by their 
investment horizons, and examine the association between institutional investor type and 
firms’ discretionary earnings management strategies in two mutually exclusive settings: firms 
that do and do not use accruals to meet/beat earnings targets. The results show that long-term 
institutional investors constrain accruals management in firms that manage earnings to 
meet/beat earnings target. Transient institutional ownership is systematically associated with 
aggressive earnings management in firms that manage earnings to meet/beat their earnings 
benchmarks. 
China’s institutional investors represented by fund companies are often criticized for 
their spending resources and doing analyses for choosing firms rather on monitoring firms. 
They are typical transient investors, because they are more likely to sell their shares of poorly 
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performing companies and buy shares of good performing companies. Although, selling 
shares is also an external discipline on firms’ management, it is not as effective as monitoring 
management behaviour. Thus, we present our sixth hypothesis: 
H6:  Institutional  ownership  in  China  does  not  play  a  monitoring  role  to 
mitigate earnings management. 
Some studies suggest that when managers hold a sufficient proportion of ownership, the 
agency problem should be mitigated, because larger managerial ownership fosters alignment 
incentives, and thus opportunistic earnings management are not employed (Gul et al., 2003). 
Warfield et al. (1995) provide evidence that managerial ownership is negatively related to the 
magnitude of earnings management. They also show that an inverse relationship between 
managerial ownership and absolute abnormal accruals becomes moderated in the case of 
regulated firms. 
In  contrast,  some  investigations  argue  that  large  managerial  ownership  may  give 
managers enough power to make decisions that suit their own interests. Barnea and Rubin 
(2010) have shown that ownership by managers and large blockholders (families for example) 
reduce corporate incentives of social responsibility. Smith (1976) and Dhaliwal et al. (1982) 
predict that greater managerial ownership has an entrenchment effect. Managers extrapolate 
private benefits through manipulating earnings at the cost of other shareholders. Considering 
the new emerging market, which has weak minority shareholders’ protection in China, we 
assume that the entrenchment effect dominates the alignment effect in relation to managerial 
ownership and earnings management. Thus our seventh hypothesis is: 
H7: Managerial ownership is positively associated with earnings management 
due to the entrenchment effect, which surmounts the alignment effect. 
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3   Data and Variables 
 
3.1 Data 
 
Our initial sample comprises the firms that issued A shares, or also issued B shares or H 
shares, and were listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges at least for six 
consecutive years from 1999 to 2010. The firms that have incomplete data set or are in the 
financial industry are eliminated. We also exclude firms classified by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as ‘particular treatment’ (PT) firms. PT firms are classified 
as having suffered a loss for three consecutive years and thus have heavy restriction in 
reporting and share trading imposed on them by CSRC. Most PT firms have suspended 
business, are planned for merger, or are delisted. However, we include ‘special treatment’ 
(ST) firms, which are classified as having experienced negative profit for two consecutive 
years, but they are still operating similar to normal firms. 
Since the calculation of earnings quality measures requires yearly incremental data or 
prior year’s data, or both prior and subsequent years data, and the measures are generated by 
regression modellings within rolling five-year windows, the number of examinable 
observations diminish. The maximal sample in use consists of 1,176 firms with 7,937 firm- 
year observations reported from 2004 to 2010, which is an unbalanced panel data set. 
The majority of data are collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research Database (CSMAR) created by the GTA Information Technology Company and the 
University of Hong Kong. The supplementary data come from a series of Shanghai Stock 
Exchange Statistical Annuals, Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Books, and from firms’ annual 
reports available from the firms’ homepages. Certain errors have been corrected by checking 
various data sources. 
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j ,t   
j ,t   
3.2 Variables of Earnings Management 
Earnings consist of cash and accruals. Accruals are the difference between earnings and cash 
flow, and can be divided into normal and discretionary accruals. One role of accruals is to 
shift or adjust the recognition of cash flows over time so that the adjusted number better 
measures firm performance. Earnings that map more closely into cash flows are more 
desirable, and are thus designated as being of high earnings quality. Earnings management 
leads to increasing divergence between earnings and cash flow, as well as less predictable, 
and are thus designated as being of low earnings quality. Dechow and Dichev (2002) develop 
a measure of accruals quality and argue that the quality of accruals and earnings is negatively 
related to the magnitude of estimation error in accruals. Our first earnings management 
variable is accrual quality (AccrualQuality) based on Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model 
relating to total current accruals to the lagged, current, and future cash flows from operations: 
 
TCA
j ,t 
 
 
= b + b 
CFO 
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+ b
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 CFO j ,t +1   
+ e
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j ,t 
 
Asset 
j ,t −1 
Asset 
j ,t −1 
Asset 
j ,t −1 
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j ,t −1 (1) 
 
Where TCA j, t  represents the firm j’s total current accruals in year t; Asset j, t − 1  is firm j’s 
total assets in year t − 1; CFO j, t   is firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t. 
For each firm-year, we estimate Equation (1) by rolling over a five-year window. The 
accruals quality is represented by the standard deviation of estimated residual σ ( e
   
). Large 
(small) values of σ ( e
   
) correspond to lower (higher) accruals quality, and lower (higher) 
 
earnings quality, because there is less (more) precision about the mapping of current accrual 
into current-period, last-period, and next-period cash flows. 
Normal accruals are those obligatory expenses or income that has yet to be realized, but 
are already recorded in the account books according to accounting rules; while discretionary 
accruals (DisAccrual) describe where the company uses its own discretion (rather than 
procedural obligations) in deciding whether or not to make the accruals. If they choose not to 
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Asset 
make the accruals, they do not show the liability or revenue on their financial statements. 
Thus,  discretionary  accruals  are  a  practical  tool  in  earnings  management.  Our  second 
earnings management variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals (AdisAccrual) 
calculated using the Jones model and the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
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(4) 
 
Where: TA j, t represents the total accruals of firm j in year t, which is equal to total current 
accruals plus depreciation; Rev j, t is the revenue of firm j in year t; PPE j, t is the gross 
property, plant and equipment; AR j, t is the accounting receivable of firm j in year t; NDA j, t 
represents nondiscretionary accruals; and DA j, t represents discretionary accruals. 
3.3 Variables of Ownership Characteristics 
 
The firms listed in China’s domestic market might only issue A shares to domestic investors, 
or also issue B shares to both foreign and domestic investors, or also issue H shares in the 
Hong Kong market for foreign investors. We set a foreign investment dummy (ForeignInv) 
that codes 1 if a firm issued foreign shares and 0 otherwise. The firms that solely issued B 
shares or H shares are not included in this research. 
The largest shareholder of a firm can be the state, a family founder, a collective entity, 
or a legal person. We set a state dummy (StateLargest) that codes 1 if a state agency is the 
largest owner and 0 otherwise. The largest shareholders are most likely the controlling 
shareholders in the context of China. 
The state ownership ratio (StateRatio) is calculated as the number of shares held by the 
state divided by the total number of shares outstanding. The state can be represented by 
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various state agencies, such as State Asset Management Bureaus, SOEs affiliated to the 
central government, and SOEs affiliated to local government. Alternatively the state can be 
represented by different entities. 
The tradable share ratio (TradeRatio) is calculated as the number of tradable shares 
divided by total number of shares outstanding. The tradable shares consist of tradable A 
shares, B shares, and H shares. 
The total ownership concentration (Top5Total) is measured as a ratio of the number of 
shares held by the top five large shareholders divided by total number of shares outstanding. 
In most firms, the top five large shareholders comprise mainly non-tradable shareholders. 
The  tradable  ownership  concentration  (Top5Ttrade)  is  measured  as  a  ratio  of  the 
number of shares held by the top five tradable shareholders divided by total number of 
tradable shares outstanding. Tradable shares are exclusive in this measure. 
Institutional ownership by fund companies (FundRatio) is measured as a ratio of the 
number of shares held by fund companies divided by the total number of shares. Because the 
institutional shareholders have unclear definitions in China’s market, the fund ratio is a better 
proxy of institutional ownership and embodies a more sensible analysis. 
Managerial  ownership  (ManagRatio)  is  measured  as  a  ratio  of  the  number  of 
managerial shares divided by total number of shares outstanding. In CSMAR data, there are 
two categories of managerial shares. The broad one refers shares held by total members in 
director, supervisor, and top management teams. The narrowed one, which we selected for 
this research, refers only to the shares held by members of the top management team. 
3.4 Control Variables 
 
We consider the several control variables of firm characteristics in our regression analyses. 
Firm size is a logarithm of total assets (LogAsset). Leverage (Leverage) is the ratio of total 
liability to total assets. Growth is the increase in the ratio of annual sale (GrowthSale). 
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Financial distress (FirmST) is a dummy variable that codes 1 if a firm is designated by CSRC 
as ST firm and 0 otherwise. We also included an industry dummy variable (IndustryD) to 
control  for  the  difference  in  accruals  properties  across  industries,  and  a  yearly dummy 
(YearD) variable to control for the possible policy change in the sample period. 
In order to avoid the influence of extreme outliners, we follow the practice suggested 
by Francis et al. (2004) that involves winsorizing the values of accruals quality, discretionary 
accruals, absolute value of discretionary accruals, leverage and growth in sale the 99 and 1 
percents. 
 
 
 
4   Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the statistics of earnings management measures. As Cornett 
(2008) indicates, discretionary accruals must be revised at some point. The average value 
should be near zero, due to the summation of positive and negative discretionary accruals 
generated  from  auto-regression.  The  mean  and  median  of  discretionary  accruals  in  our 
sample are small, at 0.51 percent and -0.01 percent of assets. The mean and median of the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals are relatively large, at 6.76 percent and 3.60 percent 
of assets. The mean and median of accruals quality are at 4.18 percent and 2.66 percent of 
assets. Both discretionary accruals and accruals quality have larger means than medians. This 
implies that the values of earnings management measures are right skewed, and thus some 
firms manage earnings seriously than majority firms do. 
< Table 1 here> 
 
Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the statistics of ownership characteristics. According to 
our calculations, 9.81 percent of firms issued B shares or/and H shares, and simultaneously 
has A shares listed on the market. Approximately 90 percent of firms are exclusively owned 
by domestic investors. The state (a state representative or entity) is the largest shareholder in 
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50.98 percent of listed firms, which indicates that the state took important role in controlling 
listed companies. However, the state share ratio is 22.73 percent, which is relatively lower 
than the 50.98 percent of firms in which state is the largest shareholder. One reason is that 
this 22.73 percent is an equal weighted average; if the value weighted average is applied it 
would reach 36.19 percent. The other cause is that the CSRC promulgated a provision in 
2005 to eliminate non-tradable shares.
1 
Many state-controlled firms reduced their nondurable 
 
shares to a threshold of ownership are still large enough to control the firms in this period. 
 
The tradable shares are accounted for 61.38 percent of total shares outstanding on 
average. Tradable ownership increases over recent years, and firms with full tradable 
ownership emerge. The total ownership is highly concentrated. Approximately 50.57 percent 
of shares, on average, are owned by the top five large shareholders, which means that they 
are able to control at least half of the stock market. The tradable ownership concentration is 
relatively low. The top five tradable share investors hold 14.64 percent of tradable shares. 
However, they have leverage effect in determining market prices, because approximately 40 
percent of shares are non-tradable. The institutional ownership by fund companies and 
managerial ownership is quite low, with values of only 2.95 and 0.1 percent respectively. 
Many firms have never allocated shares to managers and/or have no investors of fund 
companies, although we believe this situation will change. 
Panel C of Table 1 describes firms’ characteristics that are control variables in our 
regression analyses. The average size of listed firms is 5,700 million Chinese yuan, which is 
larger than the values of median, 25th and 75th percentiles, and thus shows that most firms 
are small in size. The leverage is 57.23 percent on average, indicating that more than half of 
capital is made up of liabilities for most firms. The annual growth of sales is high, at 19.03 
percent on average, although at least 25 percent of firms have negative growth ratios. 
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The correlation coefficients between variables in regression analyses are arranged in 
Table 2. The upper triangular matrix represents a Spearman correlation and the lower 
triangular matrix represents a Pearson correlation. Values in italics are probabilities of 
significances. Overall, the signs and values of most coefficients in the corresponding cells of 
the two matrixes have no meaningful differences. Asymmetric distribution of variables seem 
not serious to produce biased results. To save space, we refer to the Pearson correlation in the 
lower triangular matrix in the following discussion. 
< Table 2 here> 
 
From Table 2, we may observe that the earnings management variables of discretionary 
accruals and accruals quality are negatively correlated with the state largest ownership 
dummy, tradable ownership ratio, tradable ownership concentration and institutional 
ownership ratio; and are positively correlated with the foreign investment dummy, state 
ownership ratio, total ownership concentration and managerial ownership ratio. The signs of 
those correlation coefficients are consistent with our hypotheses except for concerning 
statistical significance. A correlation coefficient represents a naïve relationship between the 
two  variables,  which  does  not  consider  the  influence  of  other  variables  that  must  be 
controlled  against  each  other.  Thus,  with  reference  to  the  correlation  coefficients,  we 
herewith conduct regression analyses. 
 
 
 
5   Regression Analyses 
 
5.1 Regression with Individual Ownership Variable 
 
We  first  regress  on  earnings  management  with  individual  ownership  characteristics  and 
control variables. The results with the dependent variable of absolute discretionary accruals 
are arranged in Panel A of Table 3, and the results with the dependent variable of accrual 
quality are arranged in Panel B of Table 3. 
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The  coefficients  of  ForeignInv  are  positive  and  statistically significant  at  the  five 
percent level in Panel B, where the dependent variable is accrual quality. They are the 
evidence that foreign ownership and foreign accounting standards cannot monitor firms to 
reduce earnings management. Instead, the coexistence of domestic and foreign ownership in a 
firm may encourage the manager to manipulate earnings in preparation of financial reports, 
so that it complies with both domestic and international accounting standards. Thus, the 
regressions results regarding foreign ownership in our study convince the first hypothesis that 
firms with foreign investment in B shares or H shares may have more incentives to manage 
earnings than firms only with domestic investment in A shares. Our result is likely consistent 
with that of Wang and Campbell (2012) who state that the application of IFRS does not deter 
earnings management. However, our results are against that of Xu et al. (2012) and Firth et al. 
(2007). Xu et al. (2012) show that firms controlled by foreign investors have higher earnings 
quality than firms controlled by state. Firth et al. (2007) indicate that foreign shareholders 
appear to enhance the earnings–returns relation. 
< Table 3 here> 
 
The state ownership ratio (StateRatio) has a positive coefficient, but is statistically 
insignificant;  while  the  state  dummy  (StateLargest)  has  a  negative  coefficient  and  is 
significant at one percent level in both Panel A and Panel B. State ownership seems not a 
determinant on earnings management. However, when a state agency is the largest owner, 
firms are most likely in key industries and have more ways to access capital and resources. 
The managers are also possibly assigned by state authorities and compensated by both 
remuneration and political promotion. Earnings management therefore is less meaningful. 
The result is consistent with our second hypothesis: State ownership is positively related to 
earnings management unless a state agency is the largest shareholder of the firm, in which 
earnings management incentives and necessity are mitigated. Our finding is somehow close 
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to that of Wang and Yung (2011), who claim that the level of earnings management of state- 
owned enterprises is lower than that of privately-owned firms in China even after controlling 
for the effect of tunneling. But our results counter that of Xu et al. (2012). They argue that 
firms controlled by foreign investors have higher earnings quality than firms controlled by 
state. 
The coefficients of tradable share ratio (TradeRatio) are negative at the one percent 
significant level. In comparison with non-tradable shareholders, tradable shareholders have 
dual ways to monitor managers. While tradable shareholders have voting rights to directly 
intervene in managers’ decisions, they are also subdued by an external discipline force that 
occurs when selling shares to indirectly influence managers’ decisions. Managers pay more 
attention to tradable shareholders’ responses when they make decisions that are not aligned 
with  shareholder  interests.  The  results  support  our  third  hypothesis,  that  the  tradable 
ownership ratio is negatively associated with earnings management due to the disciplining 
power from selling shares. Firth et al. (2007) also show that the percentage of tradable shares 
appear to enhance the earnings–returns relation that is an evidence of high earnings quality 
and low earnings management. 
The total ownership concentration (Top5Total) has positive coefficients, and these are 
significant at the one percent level in both Panels A and B. This result coincides with the 
evidence in Haw et al. (2004) and Leuz (2006). Highly concentrated ownership provides 
large shareholders with sufficient power to direct managers into taking actions to expropriate 
minority shareholders’ wealth, while minority shareholders have a free ride in monitoring 
managerial decisions. Thus, the results support our fourth hypothesis, that total ownership 
concentration  is  positively  related  to  earnings  management  due  to  the  liquidity  effect 
resulting from large non-tradable ownership. In this definition of ownership concentration, 
our result seems not to be against previous evidences. Firth et al., 2007 indicate that firms 
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with highly concentrated share ownership have lower earnings informativeness. Liu and Lu 
(2007) document that the ownership of top one shareholder has positive relation while the 
ownership of top 2 to top 10 shareholders has negative relation with earnings management. 
Contrary to the situation for Top5Total, the Top5Trade has negative coefficients: one is 
at one percent significance in Panel A and the other is at 10 percent significance in Panel B. 
The ownership of large tradable shareholders is most likely smaller than that of large non- 
tradable shareholders, and thus large tradable shareholders have no controlling power to 
expropriate other shareholders’ wealth. Instead, they are confronted with tunnelling from 
controlling shareholders and entrenchment from managers. Their ownership stake has 
sufficient worth for them to monitor the firms’ operation. Thus, the results confirm our fifth 
hypothesis, that tradable ownership concentration is negatively related to earnings 
management due to the lock-up effect resulting from tradable ownership. 
The coefficients of institutional ownership by fund companies (FundRatio) are 
statistically insignificant, although they have a negative sign in Panel A and a positive sign in 
Panel B. China’s institutional investors represented by fund companies are transient, rather 
than long-term investors. They are more likely to move investment from underperforming 
firms, and be unwilling to spend resources on monitoring firms. This coincides with our sixth 
hypothesis, that institutional ownership in China cannot play a monitoring role in monitoring 
earnings management in China. Our result support Firth et al. (2007)’s argument that 
institutional ownership are not likely to influence accounting quality in China. 
Managerial ownership (ManagRatio) has positive coefficients that are insignificant on 
the dependent variable of AdisAccrual and significant at the one percent level on the 
dependent variable of AccrualQuality. In China, managerial ownership is only approximately 
0.1 percent on average, which is too low to align managers’ interests with shareholders’ 
 
benefits. Instead, the managers who own the shares in firms expect compensation from both 
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salary and ownership, which may be approached by earnings management. The seventh 
hypothesis  is  therefore  confirmed:  managerial  ownership  is  positively  associated  with 
earnings management due to the entrenchment effect, which surmounts the alignment effect. 
Our result refutes Liu and Yung (2011)’s evidence that managerial ownership is most likely 
reduce earnings management. 
The  regression  performed  also  generates  highly  consistent  coefficients  with  each 
control variable on two dependent variables. The coefficients of control variables are also 
meaningfully in line with the literature. Previous studies have predicted (and found) that firm 
size is negatively associated with earnings management because fixed costs are associated 
with maintaining adequate internal control procedures over financial reporting (Ball and 
Foster, 1982). Small firms are more likely to have internal control deficiencies, and thus 
correct previously reported earnings (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989; Ge and McVay, 2005). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that a high leverage may imply that a firm is closer 
to a debt covenant restriction. Thus, managers of highly leveraged firms could take action to 
boost income and manipulate financial reporting so as to avoid violating debt covenants. 
Dechow et al. (1996) find that earnings manipulation firms have higher leverage ratios and 
are more likely to have approached violation of debt covenants during and after the 
manipulation period than normally leverage firms. 
Many researchers have investigated the relationships between firms’ growth and 
earnings quality in different dimensions. They have found that high-growth firms have lower 
earnings quality represented by earnings persistence; in particular, when growth is measured 
using sales growth or net operating asset growth (Nissim and Penman, 2001; Penman and 
Zhang, 2002). Low earnings quality could be the result of measurement errors in earnings and 
earnings management opportunities (Richardson et al., 2005). Firms manipulate earnings by 
changing product prices or offering credit sales. 
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Firm performance can be causally connected with earnings management. On one hand, 
earnings management may mislead investors, and firms’ decisions made based on the 
mendacious information could distort firms’ operation. On the other hand, weak performance 
provides managers with incentives to engage in earnings management. Firms that perform 
poorly are more likely to engage in earnings-increase management to avoid financial distress 
and bankruptcy (Doyle et al., 2007a; Kinney and McDaniel, 1989). 
5.2 Regression with Various Ownership Variables 
 
The prior regression analyses on earnings management with individual ownership 
characteristics may ignore the co-effect of various ownership characteristics on earnings 
management. Here, we regress on earnings management with various ownership 
characteristics simultaneously. As observed in Table 2, the correlation coefficients between 
StateRatio and StateLargest, between TradeRatio and StateRatio, and between Top5Total and 
Top5Trade are larger than 55 percent, multicorrllinearity may exist. Thus, we structured two 
regression models with ownership variables that do not incur multicorrllinearity and arrange 
the results in Table 4. 
< Table 4 here> 
 
The results of Model 9 and Model 10 in Table 4 match well with those in Panel A of 
Table 3, and the results of Model 11 and Model 12 are very similar to those in Panel B of 
Table 3. The signs and significances of the variable coefficients of Models 9–12 in Table 4 
almost replicate those of Models 1–8 in Table 3, although the magnitudes and t-statistics of 
coefficients have changed somewhat. The evidences with co-effects of various ownership 
characteristics nevertheless support our hypotheses. 
5.3 Robustness Tests 
 
Endogeneity is a problem that may introduce estimation bias. However, the variables of 
ownership  characteristics  are  not  endogenous  with  variables  in  the  regression  models. 
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Ownership characteristics are pre-determined by firms’ financing strategies, CSRC official 
listing rules, and ongoing reform policies. For example, the proportions of tradable ownership, 
non-tradable ownership, and foreign ownership were decided by the firms in terms of firms’ 
preference and listing rules, and were approved by the CSRC. The ownership structure would 
not change unless that new ownership policy is promulgated. 
In contrast, the firm’s characteristics variables, such as firm size and leverage ratio may 
be determined by firm growth and industry categories. Although firm size and leverage ratio 
are  control  variables,  incorrect  specification  will  alter  the  regression  results.  Thus,  we 
identify LogAsset and Leverage as endogenous variables, and selected GrowthSale, EBIT 
(earnings before interest and tax) and the set of independent variables in the original models 
as instruments. The two-stage regression (2SLS) results with Models 13–16 are reported in 
Table 5. 
We compared the results generated by OLS and 2SLS with the dependent variables 
AdisAccrual  and  AccrualQuality  respectively.  We  find  that  the  coefficients  are  quite 
consistent in signs and statistical significance between Models 9 and 13, 10 and 14, 11 and 15, 
and 12 and 16. Thus, endogeneity is not a problem in our regression modelling. 
<Table 5 here> 
 
 
 
 
6   Conclusions 
 
Our research, using a relatively recent sample of Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 
 
2010,   intensively   investigates   the   impact   of   ownership   characteristics   on   earnings 
management behaviour, including foreign ownership, state ownership, tradable ownership, 
institution ownership, managerial ownership. In particular, we define two types of ownership 
concentration: total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration. We 
suspect  that  the  tradable  ownership  concentration  has  different  determination  from  total 
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ownership  concentration  on  earnings  management.  We  also  offer  some  insight  into  the 
determinants of the most important ownership characteristics on earnings management. 
Our research shows that firms with both domestic and foreign ownership conduct more 
earnings management, because they are more likely to force their financial reports to comply 
with both domestic and international accounting standards. We show that state ownership is 
positively related to earnings management, because of the existence of several state 
representatives or state share owners in a firm. However, when a state representative or entity 
is the largest shareholder, earnings management lacks incentives, because the firm has an 
advantage in access to resources and market. 
Total ownership concentration coexists with earnings management. Controlling 
shareholders  expropriate  free-riding  minority  shareholders’  wealth  to  force  managers  to 
report earnings on their own interests. However, large tradable shareholders have no 
controlling power in most firms, because they are measurably inferior to large non-tradable 
shareholders in terms of ownership. Tradeable ownership resists earnings management, 
because the selling of shares is a disciplinary tool on managers’ behaviours. Thus tradable 
ownership concentration is negatively associated with earnings management. 
Institutional investors, represented by fund companies, prefer moving investments from 
underperforming   firms   to   performing   firms,   rather   than   effective   monitoring   firm 
management. Thus, institutional ownership has an insignificant relationship with earnings 
management. Managerial ownership emerges recent years, but it is quite low for China’s 
firms. However, it appears to be positively associated with earnings management due to the 
entrenchment effect, which surmounts the alignment effect. 
The China’s publicly listed firms are charactered with multiple ownerships. Each type 
of shareholders has their own incentives in the earnings management of firms. The incentives 
and the resulted earning management are ultimately derived by their expectation on the 
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interest and benefit that could be obtained from the earnings management. 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1.   In August 2005 the CRSC issued a guideline for publicly listed firms to reduce non- 
tradable ownership. The firms were able to sell part of their non-tradable shares 
agreed by the CRSC to institutional investors. The non-tradable shares’ buyers were 
not allowed to trade purchased shares in a lock-up period of one to two years (Jinggu 
and Ri, 2006). 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of earnings management, ownership characteristics and firm characteristics 
 
AccrualQuality is accrual quality, DisAccruals is discretionary accruals, AdisAccruals is absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, ForeignInv is foreign investment dummy that codes 1 if a firm issued foreign shares and 0 
otherwise, StateLargest is state control dummy that codes 1 if the state is the largest owner and 0 otherwise, 
StateRatio is state ownership ratio, TradeRatio is tradable share ratio. Top5Total is total ownership concentration, 
Top5Ttrade tradable ownership concentration, FundRatio is institutional ownership ratio, ManagRatio is managerial 
ownership ratio, Assets are total assets, Leverage is the ratio of liability to assets, GrowthSale is the growth ratio of 
annual sales, FrimST is a dummy variable that codes 1 if a firm is designated by CSRC as ST firm and 0 otherwise. 
 
Variable definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
10th 
percentile 
25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
90th 
percentile 
Panel A: Earnings management 
 
AccrualQuality 
 
0.0418 
 
0.0522 
 
0.0046 
 
0.0117 
 
0.0266 
 
0.0532 
 
0.0920 
 
DisAccruals 
 
0.0051 
 
0.4032 
 
-0.0944 
 
-0.0361 
 
-0.0001 
 
0.0359 
 
0.0970 
 
AdisAccruals 
 
0.0676 
 
0.0983 
 
0.0049 
 
0.0141 
 
0.0360 
 
0..0861 
 
0.1522 
 
Panel B: Ownership characteristics 
 
ForeignInv (dummy) 
 
0.0981 
 
0.2975 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
StateLargest (dummy) 
 
0.5098 
 
0.4999 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1.0000 
 
1.0000 
 
1.0000 
 
StateRatio (%) 
 
22.73 
 
23.67 
 
0 
 
0 
 
16.39 
 
42.95 
 
57.34 
 
TradeRatio (%) 
 
61.38 
 
23.59 
 
33.00 
 
42.70 
 
57.12 
 
79.99 
 
100.00 
 
Top5Total (%) 
 
50.57 
 
15.23 
 
30.35 
 
39.62 
 
50.94 
 
61.20 
 
67.74 
 
Top5Ttrade (%) 
 
14.64 
 
17.50 
 
0.95 
 
2.15 
 
7.06 
 
20.16 
 
43.76 
 
FundRatio (%) 
 
2.95 
 
6.78 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0.01 
 
1.99 
 
10.48 
 
FundRatio (%) 
 
5.22 
 
5.34 
 
0.010 
 
0.04 
 
1.28 
 
6.91 
 
16.42 
 
ManagRatio (%) 
 
0.10 
 
1.35 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0.02 
 
ManagRatio (%) 
 
0.44 
 
2.77 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0.002 
 
0.04 
 
0.144 
 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
 
Assets (million) 
 
5706 
 
24599 
 
529 
 
1008 
 
2097 
 
4476 
 
9972 
 
Leverage (Liability/assets) 
 
0.5723 
 
0.3032 
 
0.2712 
 
0.4024 
 
0.5463 
 
0.6759 
 
0.8033 
 
GrowthSale 
 
0.1903 
 
0.5044 
 
-0.2499 
 
-0.0367 
 
0.1278 
 
0.3133 
 
0.5906 
 
FrimST (dummy) 
 
0.1348 
 
0.3415 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1.0000 
 
*All means are equal weighted averages. The value weighted average of state ownership is 36.19%. 
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Table 2. Correlation coefficients between any pair variables of earnings management, ownership and firm characteristics 
 
AccrualQuality is accrual quality, DisAccruals is discretionary accruals, AdisAccruals is absolute value of discretionary accruals, ForeignInv is foreign investment dummy 
that codes 1 if a firm issued foreign shares and 0 otherwise, StateLargest is state control dummy that codes 1 if the state is the largest owner and 0 otherwise, StateRatio is 
state ownership ratio, TradeRatio is tradable share ratio. Top5Total is total ownership concentration, Top5Ttrade tradable ownership concentration, FundRatio is institutional 
ownership ratio, ManagRatio is managerial ownership ratio, LogAsset is logarithm of total assets, Leverage is the ratio of liability to assets,   GrowthSale is the growth ratio 
of annual sales, FrimST is a dummy variable that codes 1 if a firm is designated by CSRC as ST firm and 0 otherwise. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
AdisAccrual (1) 1 0.276 0.047 -0.078 0.034 -0.085 0.009 -0.096 -0.073 -0.028 -0.112 0.127 0.031 0.108 
   <0.001 0.199 <0.001 0.083 <0.001 0.41 <0.001 <0.001 0.012 <0.001 <0.001 0.006 <0.001 
AccrualQuality (2) 0.38 1 0.016 -0.111 0.061 -0.068 0.004 -0.085 -0.104 -0.019 -0.136 0.15 0.018 0.148 
  <0.001  0.192 <0.001 0.312 <0.001 0.76 <0.001 <0.001 0.127 <0.001 <0.001 0.152 <0.001 
ForeignInv (3) 0.029 0.009 1 0.039 0.054 0.025 0.078 0.121 0.001 0.031 0.168 -0.002 -0.031 0.009 
  0.212 0.495  0 <0.001 0.024 <0.001 <0.001 0.997 0.006 <0.001 0.846 0.006 0.406 
StateLargest (4) -0.083 -0.122 0.039 1 0.8 -0.367 0.213 -0.289 0.108 0.016 0.175 -0.107 0.031 -0.123 
  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.162 <0.001 <0.001 0.005 <0.001 
StateRatio (5) 0.033 0.096 0.048 0.774 1 -0.595 0.426 -0.418 -0.072 -0.019 0.162 -0.099 0.056 -0.088 
  0.165 0.222 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.09 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
TradeRatio (6) -0.113 -0.064 0.02 -0.398 -0.608 1 -0.623 0.725 0.001 0.053 0.089 -0.048 -0.074 -0.073 
  <0.001 <0.001 0.076 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 0.923 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Top5Total (7) 0.027 0.013 0.109 0.211 0.466 -0.572 1 -0.113 -0.097 -0.11 0.21 -0.086 0.124 -0.071 
  0.016 0.315 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Top5Ttrade (8) -0.096 -0.063 0.118 -0.36 -0.422 0.748 -0.062 1 0.149 0.014 0.24 -0.089 0.009 -0.12 
  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  0.207 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.428 <0.001 
FundRatio (9) -0.057 -0.055 -0.013 0.033 -0.032 0.12 -0.009 0.149 1 0.207 0.277 -0.078 0.088 -0.155 
  <0.001 <0.001 0.242 0.003 0.005 <0.001 0.401 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
ManagRatio (10) 0.005 0.033 -0.02 -0.07 -0.066 0.034 -0.007 0.046 0.081 1 0.007 -0.03 -0.002 -0.028 
  0.683 0.008 0.073 <0.001 <0.001 0.003 0.512 <0.001 <0.001  0.529 0.008 0.843 0.012 
LogAsset (11) -0.176 -0.234 0.142 0.164 0.128 0.096 0.156 0.261 0.405 0.024 1 -0.077 0.221 -0.325 
  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.033  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Leverage (12) 0.225 0.278 -0.009 -0.052 -0.052 -0.023 -0.056 -0.061 -0.097 -0.033 -0.186 1 0.005 0.232 
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 <0.001 <0.001 0.408 <0.001 <0.001 0.038 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.003 <0.001  0.671 <0.001 
GrowthSale (13) 0.029 0.044 -0.022 0.063 0.057 -0.041 0.111 0.066 0.179 0.027 0.156 -0.055 1 -0.178 
  <0.001 <0.001 0.048 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.017 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 
FirmST (14) 0.153 0.178 0.009 -0.123 -0.073 -0.066 -0.076 -0.139 -0.254 -0.062 -0.344 0.354 -0.119 1 
  <0.001 <0.001 0.406 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
Upper triangular matrix represents Spearman correlation; lower triangular matrix represents Pearson correlation. Values in italic are probabilities of significances. 
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Table  3  Cross-sectional  time  series  regression  on  earnings  management  with  individual  ownership 
characteristics (OLS) 
 
AdisAccruals is absolute value of discretionary accruals, AccrualQuality is accrual quality, ForeignInv is 
foreign investment dummy that codes 1 if a firm issued foreign shares and 0 otherwise, StateRatio is state 
ownership ratio, StateLargest is state control dummy that codes 1 if the state is the largest owner and 0 
otherwise, TradeRatio is tradable share ratio. Top5Total is total ownership concentration, Top5Ttrade tradable 
ownership concentration, FundRatio is institutional ownership ratio, ManagRatio is managerial ownership 
ratio, LogAsset is logarithm of total assets, Leverage is the ratio of liability to assets, GrowthSale is the growth 
ratio of annual sales, FrimST is a dummy variable that codes 1 if a firm is designated by CSRC as ST firm and 
0 otherwise, IndustryD is industry dummy and YearlyD is year dummy. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable is absolute values of discretionary accruals (AdisAccrual) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 0.301 
(14.67**) 
0.304 
(14.95**) 
0.295 
(14.49**) 
0.320 
(15.77**) 
0.301 
(14.90**) 
0.293 
(14.40**) 
0.301 
(14.51**) 
0.301 
(14.86**) 
ForeignInv 0.001 
(0.15) 
       
StateRatio  0.007 
(1.41) 
      
StateLargest   -0.006 
(-2.87**) 
     
TradeRatio    -0.039 
(-7.66**) 
    
Top5Total     0.001 
(6.37**) 
   
Top5Ttrade      -0.001 
(-3.24**) 
  
FundRatio       -0.001 
(-0.07) 
 
ManagRatio        0.077 
(1.00) 
LogAsset -0.010 
(-11.33**) 
-0.011 
(-11.61**) 
-0.010 
(-10.95**) 
-0.010 
(-11.24**) 
-0.012 
(-12.53**) 
-0.010 
(-10.71**) 
-0.010 
(-11.16**) 
-0.010 
(-11.51**) 
Leverage 0.058 
(15.25**) 
0.058 
(15.31**) 
0.057 
(15.07**) 
0.058 
(15.22**) 
0.059 
(15.60**) 
0.058 
(15.16**) 
0.058 
(15.25**) 
0.058 
(15.27**) 
GrowthSale 0.011 
(4.99**) 
0.011 
(4.96**) 
0.011 
(5.02**) 
0.009 
(4.24**) 
0.009 
(4.39**) 
0.011 
(4.91**) 
0.011 
(5.00**) 
0.011 
(5.01**) 
FirmST 0.017 
(4.82**) 
0.017 
(4.84**) 
0.016 
(4.68**) 
0.015 
(4.35**) 
0.016 
(4.68**) 
0.016 
(4.66**) 
0.017 
(4.81**) 
0.017 
(4.84**) 
IndustryD include include include include include include include include 
YearlyD include include include include include include include include 
Adjusted 
R-Square 
10.53 10.26 10.55 10.19 10.99 9.65 9.53 9.54 
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Panel B: Dependent variable is accrual quality (AccrualQuality) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 0.200 
(16.83**) 
0.197 
(16.63**) 
0.190 
(16.13**) 
0.202 
(17.06**) 
0.195 
(16.58**) 
0.194 
(16.36**) 
0.199 
(16.45**) 
0.195 
(16.61**) 
ForeignInv 0.005 
(2.39*) 
       
StateRatio  0.022 
(0.88) 
      
StateLargest   -0.005 
(-3.55**) 
     
TradeRatio    -0.015 
(-4.09**) 
    
Top5Total     0.002 
(3.44**) 
   
Top5Ttrade      -0.001 
(-1.67#) 
  
FundRatio       0.001 
(1.12) 
 
ManagRatio        0.167 
(3.00**) 
LogAsset -0.008 
(-14.06**) 
-0.007 
(-13.75**) 
-0.007 
(-12.95**) 
-0.007 
(-13.87**) 
-0.008 
(-14.26**) 
-0.007 
(-13.54**) 
-0.008 
(-13.69**) 
-0.007 
(-13.84**) 
Leverage 0.037 
(17.05**) 
0.037 
(17.1**) 
0.037 
(16.86**) 
0.037 
(16.97**) 
0.038 
(17.24**) 
0.037 
(17.03**) 
0.037 
(17.08**) 
0.037 
(17.14**) 
GrowthSale 0.009 
(7.25**) 
0.009 
(7.1**) 
0.009 
(7.12**) 
0.008 
(6.57**) 
0.008 
(6.77**) 
0.009 
(7.10 
0.009 
(7.07**) 
0.009 
(7.14**) 
FirmST 0.011 
(5.38**) 
0.011 
(5.54**) 
0.010 
(5.280 
0.010 
(5.28**) 
0.011 
(5.44**) 
0.011 
(5.49**) 
0.011 
(5.57**) 
0.011 
(5.56**) 
IndustryD include include include include include include include include 
YearlyD include include include include include include include include 
Adjusted 
R-Square 
13.08 13.02 13.18 13.32 13.17 13.01 13.02 13.13 
 
Table 3 (continue) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Values in parentheses are t-statistics. **, *, and 
# 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
40  
Table  4  Cross-sectional  time  series  regression  on  earnings  management  (measured  by  absolute  value  of 
discretionary accruals and accruals quality respectively) with ownership characteristics (OLS) 
 
AdisAccruals is absolute value of discretionary accruals, AccrualQuality is accrual quality, ForeignInv is foreign 
investment dummy that codes 1 if a firm issued foreign shares and 0 otherwise, S StateRatio is state ownership ratio, 
StateLargest is state control dummy that codes 1 if the state is the largest owner and 0 otherwise, TradeRatio is 
tradable share ratio. Top5Total is total ownership concentration, Top5Ttrade tradable ownership concentration, 
FundRatio is institutional ownership ratio, ManagRatio is managerial ownership ratio, LogAsset is logarithm of total 
assets, Leverage is the ratio of liability to assets,    GrowthSale is the growth ratio of annual sales, FrimST is a 
dummy variable that codes 1 if a firm is designated by CSRC as ST firm and 0 otherwise, IndustryD is industry 
dummy and YearlyD is year dummy. 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
Model 9 
AdisAccrual 
Model 10 
AdisAccrual 
Model 11 
AccrualQuality 
Model 12 
AccrualQuality 
Intercept 0.312 0.294 0.206 0.203 
 (14.65**) (13.76**) (16.41**) (16.26**) 
ForeignInv 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.005 
 (0.21) (0.24) (2.73**) (2.61**) 
StateRatio  0.001  0.002 
  (0.10)  (0.76) 
StateLargest -0.014  -0.006  
 (-5.98**)  (-4.60**)  
TradeRatio -0.0454  -0.019  
 (-6.59**)  (-3.78**)  
Top5Total 0.001  0.001  
 (2.54*)  (2.24*)  
Top5Ttrade  -0.001 
(-2.91**) 
 -0.001 
(-1.89
#
) 
FundRatio 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.66) (0.13) (1.55) (1.24) 
ManagRatio 0.048 0.082 0.148 0.168 
 (0.62) (1.06) (2.65) (3.00**) 
LogAsset -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 
 (-9.87**) (-10.06**) (-12.72**) (-13.42**) 
Leverage 0.057 0.058 0.036 0.037 
 (14.89**) (15.13**) (16.61**) (17.04**) 
GrowthSale 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.009 
 (3.91**) (4.49**) (6.45**) (7.13**) 
FirmST 0.014 0.016 0.010 0.011 
 (3.96**) (4.66**) (4.83**) (5.44**) 
IndustryD include include include include 
YearlyD include include include include 
Adjusted R-Square 10.61 8.62 13.70 13.2 
Values in parentheses are t-statistics.  **, *, and 
# 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. When a 
coefficient is 0.001or -0.001, it is most likely the actual value is smaller than 0.001 in absolute value. We report 
it as 0.001 or -0.001 to avoid the confusion with value of zero. The 0.001 and -0.001 can be thought very weak in 
determination that is close to zero. 
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Table  5  Cross-sectional  time  series  regression  on  earnings  management  (measured  by  absolute  value  of 
discretionary accruals and accruals quality respectively) with ownership characteristics (2SLS) 
 
AdisAccruals is absolute value of discretionary accruals, AccrualQuality is accrual quality, ForeignInv is foreign 
investment dummy that codes 1 if a firm issued foreign shares and 0 otherwise, StateRatio is state ownership 
ratio, StateLargest is state control dummy that codes 1 if the state is the largest owner and 0 otherwise, 
TradeRatio is tradable share ratio. Top5Total is total ownership concentration, Top5Ttrade tradable ownership 
concentration, FundRatio is institutional ownership ratio, ManagRatio is managerial ownership ratio, LogAsset 
is logarithm of total assets, Leverage is the ratio of liability to assets,   GrowthSale is the growth ratio of annual 
sales, FrimST is a dummy variable that codes 1 if a firm is designated by CSRC as ST firm and 0 otherwise, 
IndustryD is industry dummy and YearlyD is year dummy. 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
Model 13 
AdisAccrual 
Model 14 
AdisAccrual 
Model 15 
AccrualQuality 
Model 16 
AccrualQuality 
Intercept 0.466 0.462 0.287 0.286 
 (14.56**) (14.45**) (15.18**) (15.09**) 
ForeignInv 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 
 (0.13) (0.33) (2.42*) (2.21*) 
StateRatio  0.010  -0.020 
  (0.016)  (-0.65) 
StateLargest -0.014  -0.008  
 (-5.89**)  (-5.57**)  
TradeRatio -0.048  -0.026  
 (-7.06**)  (-5.14**)  
Top5Total 0.001 
(1.94
#
) 
 0.001 
(+1.76
#
) 
 
Top5Ttrade  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-3.05**)  (-1.97*) 
FundRatio 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.2) (0.65) (0.73) (0.35) 
ManagRatio 0.025 0.057 0.131 0.057 
 (0.32) (0.73) (2.29*) (2.63**) 
LogAsset -0.016 -0.017 -0.009 -0.010 
 (-12.32**) (-13.04**) (-12.14**) (-13.13**) 
Leverage 0.040 
(3.43**) 
0.035 
(3.05**) 
-0.004 
(+1.64
#
) 
-0.006 
(+1.90
#
) 
GrowthSale 0.009 0.011 0.007 0.008 
 (4.17**) (5.04**) (5.43**) (5.98**) 
FirmST 0.025 0.028 0.019 0.021 
 (7.29**) (8.18**) (9.74**) (10.61**) 
IndustryD include include include include 
YearlyD include include include include 
Adjusted R-Square 9.78 8.78 9.96 9.26 
Values in parentheses are t-statistics.  **, *, and 
# 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. When a 
coefficient is 0.001or -0.001, it is most likely the actual value is smaller than 0.001 in absolute value. We report 
it as 0.001 or -0.001 to avoid the confusion with value of zero. The 0.001 and -0.001 can be thought very weak in 
determination that is close to zero. 
